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Abstract
Firms commonly price discriminate across consumers based on purchase history, a practice
known as behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD). Existing studies usually assume that con-
sumer preferences follow uniform distribution, and find that BBPD benefits consumers at the cost
of firms, prisoners’ dilemma. In this paper, we consider a class of consumer preferences distribu-
tion and show that new profit and welfare results arise. In particular, when consumer preferences
are sufficiently clustered at the center of the market (e.g. triangular distribution), BBPD boosts
industry profits at the expense of consumers. This is opposite to the standard prisoners’ dilemma
results under uniform distribution. On the other hand, when consumer preferences are not clus-
tered at the center of the market, the usual findings prevail. Our results highlight the important
role of the shape of preferences and provide useful implications for relevant players including
managers, regulators and consumer advocates.
1 Introduction
Today many companies collect and utilize consumer data for price discrimination purposes. In
markets with repeat purchases, firms can use consumers’ purchase history to price discriminate, a
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practice known as behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD). BBPD is widely observed in many
markets. For example, Hannack et al (2014) find that “human shoppers got worse bargains on a
number of websites” (including Home Depot and Wal-Mart), compared to an automated shopping
browser that did not have any personal data trail associated with it. Similarly, a letter by the Con-
sumer Education Foundation’s Represent Consumers project, sent to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in June 2019, identifies that many companies create secret scores on their clients and charge
some consumers more than others taking into account their purchase history, search behavior, loca-
tion, mobile devices used, and so on.1 The letter calls for an FTC investigation into who is targeted
using the scores, and the scores’ impacts on consumers and the marketplace.
Given that behavior-based price discrimination is a ubiquitous feature in today’s business, it is
important to understand under what conditions BBPD is a winning strategy for firms and/or con-
sumers. Existing research shows that BBPD can intensify competition and hurt firm profitability
at the benefit of consumers. In fact, a common finding in models with (i) fixed uniform distributed
preferences across time, (ii) symmetric informed firms and (iii) fully informed consumers, is that
equilibrium profits decrease with price discrimination (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). In spite
of the fact that BBPD has received wide attention in the economics and marketing literature,2 to
our knowledge little is known about its implications in markets where the distribution of consumer
preferences is non-uniform. In fact, we should stress that while Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) em-
ploy a general model, their welfare comparison between uniform pricing and BBPD is made for
uniform distribution. This leaves open the question of how BBPD affects welfare under non-uniform
distributions.
Although the uniformity assumption is convenient for deriving analytical results, it may be in-
accurate in many markets. For example, a market may consist of many consumers with average
preferences and few with extreme preferences. The main goal of this paper is to assess the im-
pacts of behavior-based price discrimination in markets where the density of consumer preferences
is non-uniform. By so doing, this paper provides useful implications for competition policy agen-
cies and consumer advocates. It highlights that the shape of preferences plays an important role in
understanding the welfare effects of BBPD.
We look at the following questions. What happens to prices and profits when consumer tastes
change from uniform distribution to non-uniform distribution? Under what conditions should man-
agers expect BBPD to enhance profitability? Under what conditions should competition agencies
expect BBPD to hurt consumers, and thus take appropriate enforcement actions to restrict the use
of consumer purchase history data for price discrimination?
With these questions in mind, we model a class of non-uniform distribution characterized by a
1These companies include Home Depot, Wal-Mart, ASOS, Cheaptickets, Orbitz, Expedia, Hotels.com, Travelocity,
Priceline etc.
2Chen (2005) and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) present excellent surveys of the BBPD literature.
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single parameter β.3 When β > 0, consumers are clustered at the center of the market relative to
the edges, and the reverse holds when β < 0. We recover the commonly assumed uniform density
when β = 0. Our analysis reveals that the profit and consumer welfare effects of BBPD depend
on the shape of consumer preferences. When consumer preferences are uniformly distributed, in
comparison to non-discrimination, BBPD reduces industry profits and boosts consumer surplus.
The same happens if consumer preferences are reverse triangular (β < 0), i.e., when more consumers
are located at the edges of the market than at the center. However, BBPD raises industry profits at
the expense of consumer surplus for a wide range of positive β. This suggests that managers should
expect to employ BBPD in a profitable way in markets where consumer preferences are more likely
to be concentrated at the center of the preference line than at the edges.
1.1 Literature review
There is an extensive literature on price discrimination, covering both monopolistic and oligopolis-
tic price markets.4 Our paper is related to the strand on oligopolistic price discrimination with
best-response asymmetry (e.g., Thisse and Vives (1988), Shaffer and Zhang (1995), Liu and Serfes
(2004) and Esteves (2009)). A common finding in this literature is that price discrimination leads
to a prisoners’ dilemma game, benefiting consumers at the cost of firms.5
Our paper is most closely related to the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. In
this literature, firms can try to poach their rivals’ customers with special “introductory” prices.
Two approaches have been considered so far. In the switching costs approach (e.g. Chen, 1997 and
Taylor, 2003), consumers initially view the two firms as perfect substitutes; but in the second period
they face a switching cost if they change suppliers (ex-post heterogeneity). In the other approach,
consumers have ex-ante heterogeneous brand preferences (e.g. Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010). Models in both approaches exhibit best-response asymmetry (Corts,
1998): the strong market of one firm is the weak market of the competitor. Firms charge lower
prices to customers in weak market segments (new/rival’s customers) than to customers in strong
segments (old customers). In comparison to uniform pricing, the ability to price discriminate across
strong/weak markets reduces equilibrium profits, the classic prisoners’ dilemma.6 There are also
important differences between the two approaches. In the brand preference approach, initial prices
are high and then decrease. The reverse happens in the switching costs approach.
We build on the second approach of ex-ante heterogeneity, and assume that consumer preferences
3Details about the model can be found in Section 2.
4Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007) provide excellent surveys of the literature.
5Corts (1998) shows that best-response asymmetry is necessary but not sufficient for price discrimination to lead to
all-out competition. Liu and Shuai (2013) show that price discrimination can raise profit in a model with best-response
asymmetry.
6Both Chen and Pearcy (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) allow consumer preferences to change over time, and
look at when a firm should reward its loyal customers and when it should offer discount to entice brand switching.
They also identify conditions under which BBPD would raise firms’ profits.
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are non-uniform. A few papers (e.g., Chen and Zhang, 2009 and Esteves, 2010) have taken a
similar approach, but consider discrete distributions and generally equilibrium in mixed strategies.
In Esteves (2010), all consumers are loyal to either of the two firms, up to a degree γ > 0. Firms
have an incentive to price far apart from each other (by more than γ) so all consumers (assumed to
be naive) buy from only one firm in period 1. This avoids market sharing and learning, and prevents
competition-intensifying BBPD in period 2. The problem is that each firm prefers to be the lower
priced firm and thus both firms price aggressively in period 1. As a result BBPD leads to lower
prices in both periods relative to uniform pricing. In contrast, Chen and Zhang (2009) find that
BBPD raises firms’ profits relative to uniform pricing, similar to our paper. But the driving force
behind their result is quite different. In their model each firm has their respective loyal consumers
and competes for switchers. Only the high price firm in period 1 will have the required information
to engage in price discrimination in period 2. Thus having a lower price (and in turn serving more
consumers) in period 1 actually puts the firm in a disadvantageous position subsequently, because
it cannot distinguish loyals from switchers and price discriminate in period 2. Thus both firms have
an incentive to raise prices in period 1. In contrast, for BBPD to raise profits in our model, density
needs to be high around marginal consumers under uniform pricing (x = 12) but low around marginal
consumers under BBPD (x away from 12). This puts downward pressure on profit under uniform
pricing. In addition, forward-looking consumers become less price sensitive and in turn raise period
1 prices under BBPD. Similarly, when β > 0, forward looking firms also raise period 1 prices under
BBPD, taking into account their impacts on period 2 profits.
Our analysis reveals that BBPD can boost industry profits at the expense of consumers when
consumer preferences are sufficiently clustered around the center of the market. This result, which
depends on β – the consumer distribution parameter, has a similar flavor as that in Chen and Pearcy
(2010) whose result depends on α – the preference dependence parameter. Chen and Pearcy allow
consumer preferences between the two periods to be imperfectly correlated, and use a copula to admit
various degrees of positive dependence (α). When firms cannot commit to future prices, an increase
in α always worsens the reduction of second period profits under BBPD, but initially raises and then
reduces first period profits. Combined, BBPD raises firms’ discounted overall profits when α is small.
Analogous to their result, in our paper, BBPD has monotonic impacts on profits in each period (up
in period 1, down in period 2), and raises discounted overall profits when β is large. Shin and Sudhir
(2010) also allow consumer preferences to be imperfectly correlated between the two periods, and
further introduce consumer heterogeneity (low/high demand). They find that profits can increase
with price discrimination when preference dependence is low and consumer heterogeneity is high.
Other relevant papers have shown that profits can increase with price discrimination when a
firm has superior information on its existing consumers. For example, Subramanian et. al. (2013)
introduce consumer heterogeneity in terms of how much it costs to serve them, and each firm is able
to learn the cost of its own consumers. They show that retaining high-cost-to-serve customers, even
when they are unprofitable, can help increase the overall profitability of the firm. Similarly, Colombo
4
(2018) allows consumers to have different price sensitivity, and each firm is able to learn the price
sensitivity of its own consumers. He shows that the access to this additional information may boost
profits in comparison to uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with
respect to price sensitivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model and analyze the benchmark
case of uniform pricing in Section 2. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis of behavior-based
price discrimination, for the two special cases of uniform distribution and triangular distribution
respectively. In Section 4 we generalize the analysis to a class of non-uniform distributions, and
illustrate how the insights from the two special cases carry over. We also consider the extension of
piece-wise uniform distribution. Section 5 presents policy discussions and we conclude in Section 6.
Proofs of lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Two firms, A and B, produce differentiated nondurable goods at constant marginal cost which
we normalize to zero. The firms are located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line with firm A
(B) at 0 (1). A unit mass of consumers are continuously distributed on the line. There are two
periods of consumption and consumer preferences for the goods are constant over time.7 In each
period, consumer demands at most one unit of the good in each period. A consumer located at x
receives instantaneous utility of uA = v − pA − tx if she buys from firm A at price pA. If she buys
from firm B, her utility will be uB = v − pB − t(1 − x). We assume that v is sufficiently large so
that all consumers buy in equilibrium (covered market). Like in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), firms
and consumers have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. Each firm maximizes its discounted sum
of expected profit, and each consumer maximizes his/her discounted sum of expected utility.
Distribution of consumer preferences
A key departure of our paper from the literature is that we allow for non-uniform distribution of
consumer preferences. Let F (x) denote the cumulative distribution function with support [0, 1]. f(x)
is the corresponding density function which we assume to be smooth and symmetric around x = 12 .
Specifically, we consider a class of distribution characterized by a single parameter β as follows,
f(x) =











The parameter β has a simple interpretation – it measures the density difference between the








2 . This symmetric distribution
has the advantage of allowing us to investigate BBPD under uniform and nonuniform distribution
7For an analysis of BBPD with imperfect correlated preferences across time see Chen and Pearcy (2010).
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8 This class of distribution
covers the commonly studied uniform distribution (β = 0) and pure triangular distribution (β = 1)
as two special cases. When β increases from 0 to 1 more consumers are located around the center
of the market than at the edges. When β = 1 consumer preferences follows a pure triangular
distribution with no consumers at the edges. In contrast, when β < 0, the reverse happens and more
consumers are located at the edges of the market than at the center (which we call reverse triangular
distribution).
2.1 Benchmark case: Uniform pricing
Suppose that price discrimination is infeasible due to regulation, costs of changing prices, con-
sumers’ actions to behave anonymously, technological restrictions, etc. This benchmark case of
uniform pricing will be used as a comparison later on when we allow firms to price discriminate
across consumers.
Under uniform pricing, the two-period model reduces to two replications of the static equilibrium.
Given the uniform prices pUA and p
U
B where the superscript U denotes uniform pricing, the marginal
consumer who is indifferent between buying from the two firms is determined by









Firms’ profits are given by,
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We look for a symmetric equilibrium, which is presented in the next proposition.





8We cannot allow β to be too negative. Let us illustrate why, using the uniform price case. The equilibrium price is
given by pU = 1
1+β
. If β approaches −1, the equilibrium price, as well as the equilibrium profit, goes to infinity. This
cannot be supported as an equilibrium, because both firms would have an incentive to lower price and take the whole




. We thus set the lower
bound β at this value.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 When we depart from the uniform distribution of consumer preferences (β = 0) to a
triangular distribution with 0 < β ≤ 1, prices and profits fall. The reverse happens when consumer
preferences follow a reverse triangular distribution (β ≤ β < 0).
Since ∂p
U
∂β < 0 and
∂πU
∂β < 0, the proof of the corollary is trivial. The economic intuition is







. Since f is symmetric about
1




2 always holds. That is, what matters is the number of marginal consumers who are
indifferent between firms, f(12). This determines how many more consumers a firm can gain by
reducing its price slightly, which in turn determines firms’ incentive to undercut each other’s prices.
Note that consumer density is the same everywhere (f(x) = 1) under uniform distribution, but varies
with x under a non-uniform distribution. In particular, under triangular distribution (β ∈ (0, 1)),
more consumers are located at the center of the market and f(12) > 1. In this case, the uniform price
falls relative to the level when β = 0. In contrast, when β < 0, fewer consumers are located at the
center and f(12) < 1, supporting a higher uniform price relative to when β = 0.
Next, we calculate social and consumer surplus under uniform pricing. In the symmetric equi-
librium, all consumers buy from the closer firm which is efficient. Let TC denote the transport cost











The discounted social surplus is








Intuitively transport cost incurred by all consumers is higher when more consumers are located
at the center of the market. Therefore, as β increases TCU also increases and so welfare falls.
Finally, let CSU denote consumer surplus with uniform pricing. It is straightforward to show
that
CSU = SSU − 2πU = (1 + δ)
(
v − β
2 + 4β + 15




It can be easily verified that ∂CS
U







, which is always positive for our
range of β ∈ [β, 1].
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3 Behavior-based price discrimination with uniform and triangular
distributions
In this section, we allow firms to price discriminate across consumers based on their purchasing
history, focusing on two special cases. In the first case, consumers are uniformly distributed (β = 0).
This has been analyzed in the literature before (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Chen (2005),
Chen and Pearcy (2010)), and BBPD is found to reduce firm profits. In the second case, we consider
the triangular distribution (β = 1). We show that under this specific non-uniform distribution,
BBPD raises firm profits, in contrast to the case of uniform distribution. We lay out the intuitions,
and illustrate that the contrast is driven by the density ratio at the middle relative to the sides for
the consumer distribution.9
Under BBPD, in each period, firms choose their prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively. For
i = {A,B}, a strategy of firm i specifies p1i in period 1 and prices (poi , pni ) in period 2 targeting its
old and new consumers respectively. We impose that players’ strategies are sequentially rational, in
the sense that in equilibrium, these strategies must induce a Nash equilibrium at any second period
subgame as well as a Nash equilibrium in period 1. Given that firms are initially symmetric, we only
look for a symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
3.1 Uniform distribution
BBPD with uniform distribution has been analyzed in many existing studies (see, for example,
Chen (2005) and Chen and Pearcy (2010)). The results are presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 1 (BBPD-Uniform distribution)
When consumer preferences follow uniform distribution and firms can practice BBPD, in the
equilibrium,



















to poach rivals’ old customers.







9Extrapolating this finding to the whole class of non-uniform distribution, we conjecture that whether BBPD
can raise overall profits depends on the aforementioned density ratio, emphasizing the importance of non-uniform
distribution. This is verified in Section 4 where we analyze the case of general β.
8








(iv) Discounted consumer surplus over the two periods is





We refer the readers to previous studies (e.g., Chen (2005) and Chen and Pearcy (2010)) for more
details.
3.2 Triangular distribution
Next, we consider triangular distribution (β = 1). Note that the density function is maximized




= 2, and minimized at the extremes, f(x = 0) = f(x = 1) = 0.
Second period:
We solve the game backwards, starting with period 2. Suppose that first period prices lead to
marginal consumer x1 ∈ [0, 1] who is indifferent between buying from either firm in period 1.
Next, look at firm A’s turf on [0, x1]. These are firm A’s old consumers and thus will observe
the following second period prices: poA and p
n
B. Given these prices, some consumers will buy again
from A while others will be willing to switch to firm B. Let xA denote the marginal consumer who




poA + xA = p
n







Thus, conditional on purchasing from A in period 1 (i.e., x ∈ [0, x1]), consumers in [0, xA] will
buy from A again, while consumers in (xA, x1] will switch to B. Similarly, conditional on purchasing
from B in period 1 (i.e., x ∈ (x1, 1]), consumers in (x1, xB) will switch to A while consumers in








In period 2, firm i chooses (poi , p
n

































We can calculate firms’ demand functions as follows,
qoA = F (xA) =
1
2
(1 + pnB − poA)(1 + pnB − βpoA),
qnB = F (x1)− F (xA) =
1
2
(poA − pnB + 2x1 − 1)(1 + 2βx1 + βpnB − βpoA),
qnA = F (xB)− F (x1) =
1
2
[(poB − pnA)(1 + β + βpnA − βpoB) + (1− 2x1)(1 + 2βx1)] ,
qoB = 1− F (xB) =
1
2
(pnA − poB + 1)(βpnA − βpoB + 1). (8)
Note that the demand functions are presented for general β, even though we are considering
triangular distribution here (β = 1). Substituting β = 1 and solving firms’ first-order conditions, we
can obtain equilibrium prices in the second period. The results are presented in the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 (Triangular distribution - Period 2) When consumer preferences follow triangular distri-
bution and firms can practice BBPD, in period 2,
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√











1 − 3(16x21 + 1)
3
2 + (9− 16x21)
3
2 − 384x21 + 7
√
16x21 + 1 + 3
√
9− 16x21 + 32
)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
First period:
Next, we analyze the first period. If firms have no commitment power, then their market shares in
the first period affect their second period pricing. Forward-looking firms take this interdependence
into account when setting their first period prices. Similarly, consumers are forward-looking and
anticipate that their choice in period 1 affect the prices they receive in period 2 as well. Let x1
denote the marginal consumer in period 1, who must be indifferent between buying from A in the
first period at price p1A, and buying from B in the next period at the poaching price p
n
B; or buying
from B in the first period at price p1B, and switching to firm A in the second period at the poaching
price pnA. Therefore,










δ (pnA − pnB)
2 (1− δ)
(9)





both are functions of x1, as laid out in Lemma 2.
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Note that second period prices are functions of x1 which in turn is a function of first period
prices. Then firms’ overall profits are defined on first period prices as well, and each firm maximizes
its overall profit with respect to its first period price. Consider firm A for example. Because firm A’s
second period prices are chosen to maximize its second period profit, we can use the envelop theorem
to simplify the first-order condition, ∂ΠA
∂p1A
= 0, where ΠA is defined in equation (10). This yields:























After computing all these derivatives, we impose symmetry by evaluating the previous expression
at x1 =
1
2 . We are able to obtain closed form solution for equilibrium first period prices. Substituting
x1 =
1
2 into second period equilibrium, we can obtain second period prices and profits. Combined,
we can obtain overall profits and consumer surplus.
Next, we illustrate how BBPD affects first period prices under non-uniform distribution, via a
consumer-side effect and a firm-side effect respectively. We do this without the need to substitute
β = 1 (triangular distribution). The results are presented in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2 (Decomposing first period impact) The impact of BBPD on first-period prices can
be decomposed into a consumer-side effect and a separate firm-side effect, in the form of
pBBPD1 = (consumer-side effect)× pU1 + (firm-side effect).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The exact form of decomposition is shown in the proof. Note that in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000),
there is no firm-side effect so consumer-side effect alone determines the increase in first period prices.
In contrast, when consumers are naive (thus no consumer-side effect), the firm-side effect can still
raise or lower first period prices in our model.10 We will discuss this in more details later on in
Section 3.3 when we explore the welfare impacts of BBPD.
Next, we come back to triangular distribution (β = 1). Equilibrium prices and profits under
BBPD are presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 (BBPD-Triangular distribution)
When consumer preferences follow triangular distribution and firms can practice BBPD, in the
equilibrium,











in the first period.






















to poach rivals’ old customers.

























(iv) Overall consumer surplus over the two periods is














Proof. See the Appendix.
10In our model, consumers and firms share the same discount factor δ > 0, under both strategic and naive consumers.
When making period 1 decisions, forward-looking (or strategic) consumers take into account their surplus from both
periods. In contrast, naive consumers only take into account their immediate consumer surplus in period 1. The
distinction between forward-looking and naive consumers lies in their level of sophistication, not in δ. In particular, we
are not using δ = 0 to capture naive consumers.
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3.3 The welfare effects of BBPD
Using results under BBPD (in Lemma 1 and Proposition 3) and under uniform pricing (in Propo-
sition 1 and Equations (4)-(5)), one can easily see how BBPD affects profits, consumer surplus and
social surplus for the two special cases of uniform distribution and triangular distribution. This is
summarized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 (The welfare impacts of BBPD)
If consumer preferences follow uniform distribution, BBPD harms industry profits and welfare
but boosts consumer surplus, relative to uniform pricing. In contrast, if consumer preferences follow
triangular distribution, compared to uniform pricing, BBPD harms consumer surplus and overall
welfare but boosts industry profits.
Next, we explore the intuitions behind the above results. In particular, we decompose how BBPD
affects prices and profits in the two periods respectively.
3.3.1 Effect on prices
Most of the existing academic literature on BBPD suggests that when the market exhibits best-
response asymmetry – one firm’s weak market is the other’s strong market – the optimal choice for
each firm is to offer a lower price to its rival’s old consumers than to its own old consumers (e.g.
Chen, 1997; Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010).11 In what follows we
first check whether this happens in our setting, which applies to the second period. We then study
how BBPD affects first period prices.
As aforementioned, in an oligopoly price competition model with covered market, what matters
for equilibrium prices is the number of marginal consumers who are indifferent between firms. In a
Hotelling model with uniform distribution, the number of marginal consumers is always the same no
matter where they are. In contrast, under non-uniform distribution the density of consumers will
vary with location. We look first at second period prices.
Second period prices:
Using the results presented earlier, in Table 1 we report second period prices under uniform
pricing and BBPD, for β = 0 or β = 1 respectively. Due to symmetry, we only report firm A’s prices.
To facilitate comparison, we convert some values to decimal points when needed.
For both β values, relative to uniform pricing, prices are lower for all consumers in period 2, the
same as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Chen and Pearcy (2010) when firms cannot commit
11An exception is Shin and Sudhir (2010) who show that firms can charge a low price to their strong customers when
consumer preferences stochasticity across time and consumer heterogeneity are also high enough. Chen and Pearcy











When β = 1 pU = t2 p
o
A ≈ 0.4045t pnA ≈ 0.2135t
Table 1: Second period prices
to future prices. Since purchase history reveals consumers’ brand preferences, each firm has an
incentive to reduce the price to customers who bought from the rival, enticing them to switch.
However, because both firms set lower prices to customers in their weak markets, they induce rivals
to be more aggressive in their strong markets too. This intensifies competition and all prices fall
in period 2. Our analysis confirms the usual findings in the literature, suggesting that even when
the distribution of consumer preferences is non-uniform, firms also quote lower prices to their weak
segment than to their strong segment of consumers.
However, it is important to stress that although second period equilibrium prices fall with price
discrimination in our set-up, when the distribution of consumer preferences approaches a pure tri-
angular distribution, we find that in comparison to uniform pricing the reduction in second period
prices is smaller than the reduction under uniform distribution. In particular, if preferences are
uniform, then








while if preferences follow a pure triangular distribution, then
pU (β = 1)− poA(β = 1) ≈
t
2
− 0.4045t = 0.0955t,
pU (β = 1)− pnA(β = 1) ≈
t
2
− 0.2135t = 0.2865t.
The intuition is as follows. Under the triangular distribution marginal price changes capture
more additional consumers when the point of indifference is in the center of the market, than when
the point of indifference is closer to one or the other firm. This reduces the aggression with which
a firm seeks to drive the point of indifference into its rival’s market segment in the second period,
as the bulk of consumers are clustered near the margin of this segment. Put differently, when β
increases from 0 to 1, the density of marginal consumers under uniform pricing (x = 12) increases
which hurts the prices and profits sharply. In contrast, under BBPD, marginal consumers are away
from the center, so second period prices are not as hurt by the increase in β.
Therefore, our analysis reveals that relative to uniform pricing, when firms engage in BBPD,
they compete more aggressively in period 2 if consumer preferences are uniformly distributed than
if consumer preferences follow a triangular distribution.
First period prices:
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Next, we move on to first period. The prices are reported in the next table. We can see that
under both uniform and triangular distribution, BBPD raises period 1 prices relative to uniform
pricing.
Uniform pricing BBPD
When β = 0 pU = t p1A ≈ t+ 0.3333δt





Table 2: First period prices
The intuition for higher first period prices is that consumers become less price sensitive in period
1 when they take into account prices in period 2. This same mechanism is also found in Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000) and Chen and Pearcy (2010). But there are also subtle differences between our
paper and theirs. Let us start with Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). When consumers are naive, BBPD
has no impact on first period prices, relative to uniform pricing. Consider next our framework. Here
the decreased elasticity of demand can also explain in part why BBPD raises first period prices, when
consumers are forward-looking. The difference is that BBPD still raises first period prices even when
consumers are assumed to be naive.
Our analysis suggests that apart from reduced elasticity of demand, there should be another
driving force behind the higher first period prices. In general, BBPD generates two effects on
first period prices: a consumer-side effect and a firm-side effect. The first effect occurs because
under BBPD, forward-looking consumers correctly anticipate second period prices, become less price
sensitive in period 1 and raise equilibrium first period prices (consumer-side effect). Consider next
the firm-side effect. When firms are forward-looking, they also take into account that changes in
the first period prices change the first period marginal consumer, and in turn change the nature of
the second period competition. When consumer preferences are uniform and firms employ BBPD, a
change in the first period price has no effect on second period profit because with uniform distribution
a firm’s marginal gain in one market is exactly offset by its loss in the other (∂π2∂p1 = 0). Thus, in
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), under symmetry (x1 =
1
2), the firm-side effect plays no role and the
consumer-side effect fully determines the result that BBPD raises first period prices.
In the current model we find that if consumer preferences are non-uniform (β = 1), a change in
the first period price does not cancel out in the neighborhood of x1 =
1
2 . Specifically, we find that
∂π2A
∂p1A
> 0, suggesting that firm A’s marginal gain in one second period market is higher than its loss
in the other market. In other words, if firm A becomes more aggressive in the first period, its strong
market becomes larger in the second period, especially if consumer preferences are clustered at the
center of the market. This forces firm B to reduce its prices in period 2. Thus aggressive pricing
in the first period will induce its competitor not only to be aggressive in the first period, but also
in the second period. To avoid this, firms want to raise their first period prices above the uniform
price when β = 1. Therefore, even if consumers are naive (i.e., no consumer-side effect), the firm-side
effect can still lead to higher first period prices under BBPD.
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In our paper, consumer preferences stay the same in the two periods. In contrast, Chen and
Pearcy (2010) allow the preference dependence to be imperfect, captured by a preference dependence
parameter α. Because of the imperfect preference dependence, BBPD may raise or lower first period
prices depending on α, even though it always reduces second period prices. An increase in α always
worsens the reduction of second period profit under BBPD, but first period profit first increases
and then decreases with α. Combined, BBPD raises firms’ discounted overall profits only when α
is small. This has a flavor similar to our results with respect to β. That is, BBPD always worsens
period 2 profit relative to uniform pricing, but tends to increase first period profit when β is large.
Combined, BBPD raises discounted overall profit when β is sufficiently high. Next, we look at the
profit effects of BBPD in details.
3.3.2 Profit effects and managerial implications
An important question for managers and marketing practitioners is when they should expect
BBPD to improve profitability. Next, we look at how BBPD affects firms’ profits in period 1 and 2
respectively, as well as their discounted overall profits. The results are presented in the next table,
where the top (bottom) panel is for β = 0 (β = 1).










A ≈ 0.2778t 0.5556
πA = 0.5t+ 0.5δt πA ≈ 0.5t+ 0.4444δt < 1
(β = 0)












A ≈ 0.1693t 0.6772
πA = 0.25t+ 0.25δt πA ≈ 0.25t+ 0.2710δt > 1
(β = 1)
Table 3: Profits by periods and overall profits
In the table, πtA is each firm’s profit in period t = 1, 2, while πA is each firm’s discounted overall
profit. To facilitate comparison between BBPD and uniform pricing, we also calculate the BBPD to
uniform pricing profit ratio (third column). From the table one can see that for both β = 0 or β = 1,
BBPD raises profits in period 1 but lowers profits in period 2. This is in line with the price effects
we discussed earlier. However, it is important to stress that the decrease in second period profits due
to price discrimination is smaller when β increases. This suggests that the negative effect of BBPD
on second period profits falls when we depart from a uniform distribution of consumer preferences
to a triangular one. In fact, from the table we can see that the BBPD to Uniform pricing ratio is
higher for both first and second period profits when β = 1, relative to β = 0. This allows BBPD
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to reduce overall profits when β = 0 but the opposite happens when β = 1. In the next section, we
will consider general β and show that BBPD raises overall profits when β is sufficiently high (e.g.,
β > 0.194 for any δ ∈ (0, 1]).
For managers and practitioners our analysis highlights that while BBPD with uniform preferences
is bad for profits, it can be a winning strategy in markets where consumer preferences are clustered
at the center of the market. When consumers are increasingly clustered at the center, BBPD makes
companies compete less aggressively in both periods relative to uniform pricing, permitting overall
profits to increase. Therefore, our analysis suggests that a good understanding of the distribution
of consumer preferences is a necessary condition for managers to assess the profitability of this price
discrimination based on consumers’ purchase history. A simple proxy is to view consumers at the
edges (center) as loyals (switchers). To determine whether BBPD is profitable, managers need to
estimate their loyal-switcher ratios.
4 BBPD with general β
In the previous section we have explored the welfare implications of BBPD under the special
cases of uniform distribution (β = 0) and pure triangular distribution (β = 1). In this section, we
generalize the analysis to β ∈ [β, 1]. Our goal is to show that the spirit of the results in the previous
section carries through, in particular, when consumers are sufficiently clustered around the center
relative to the sides, BBPD raise firms’ overall profits.
We solve the game backwards, starting with period 2. Denote the marginal consumer by x1 ∈ [0, 1]
who is indifferent between buying from either firm in period 1. Earlier when analyzing triangular
distribution, we have laid out firms’ demand functions for general β (equation (8)). Using these
demand functions, after some (tedious) computation, we can solve the second period equilibrium
and obtain closed form solutions for period 2 prices. The results are quite tedious and are relegated
to the Appendix (see “BBPD with general β” toward the end of the Appendix). The steps to
solve for equilibrium first period prices are similar to those in the case of triangular distribution,
except without imposing β = 1. After computing all relevant derivatives, we impose symmetry, i.e.,
x1 =
1
2 , and derive the equilibrium first period prices.
Having solved the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we can then explore the welfare effects of
BBPD relative to uniform pricing (see Lemma 1) for general β. We look at this in details next.
4.1 Price and profit effects of BBPD
This section presents our main findings in terms of prices and profits, when we depart from a
uniform distribution of consumer preferences to a class of non-uniform distributions. Since equilib-
rium prices and profits are all linear in the unit transport cost t, we normalize t = 1 in the rest of
the paper. We first explore the role of δ in the prices and profits. The results are presented in the
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next Lemma.
Lemma 3 (The role of δ) Under BBPD with general β, in the equilibrium,
(i) Second period prices are independent of δ.
(ii) First-period price takes the form of
pBBPD1 = p
U
1 + g(β) · δ,
where g(β) is a function of β only.
(iii) The impacts of BBPD on social surplus, profit and consumer surplus, measured by SSBBPD−
SSU , πBBPD − πU , and CSBBPD −CSU respectively, are all proportional to δ, i.e., linear in δ with
zero intercept.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Our focus is on how BBPD affects prices and profits, and we are able to obtain closed form
solutions under general β and δ. Based on results (ii) and (iii) above, we assume δ = 1 without loss
of generality. But even with t = 1 and δ = 1, the expressions for prices and proits are too lengthy to
report and compare.12 Therefore, we present our main findings using figures plotted as a function of
β, the single parameter which characterizes the class of distributions. Specifically, we plot prices and
profits when price discrimination is not permitted (uniform pricing) and when BBPD is permitted.
Using the closed form expressions, we can easily check how variables of interest vary with β.
4.1.1 Effect on prices
Second period prices:
Figure 1 plots second period prices under uniform pricing and BBPD respectively. Relative to
uniform pricing, prices are lower for all consumers in period 2, the same as in the previous section
(when β = 0 or β = 1). Our analysis confirms the usual findings in the literature, suggesting that
price discrimination intensifies competition even under non-uniform distribution. Moreover, when β
increases, in comparison to uniform pricing the reduction in second period prices becomes smaller.
This is in similar spirit as what we have found previously when comparing β = 1 to β = 0.
First period prices:
Figure 2 left panel plots first period prices under uniform pricing and BBPD respectively. We can
see that BBPD raises first period prices for the main range for β. Specifically, this happens as long
as β > −0.378. As previously discussed, in our model, BBPD generates two effects on first period
12Equilibrium first period prices are given at the end of the Appendix. Equilibrium second period prices and profits
can be found by substituting x1 =
1
2
into second period equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Second period prices
Red line: Uniform price; Blue dots: Price to old customers; Green dash line: Price to new customers
prices: a consumer-side effect and a firm-side effect, and their combination is reflected in Figure 2
left panel. The consumer-side effect always induces firms to charge higher first period prices. The
firm side effect, while absent under uniform distribution, has been shown to exist under triangular
distribution (β = 1) earlier. Here, for general β, it turns out that the direction of the firm-side effect
depends on the sign of β. To see this, we shut down the consumer-side effect by considering naive
consumers. Only the firm-side effect is present. The first period prices are plotted in Figure 2 right
panel. We can see that BBPD leads to higher first period prices under naive consumers if and only
if β > 0.
Figure 2: First period prices: Strategic consumers (left panel); Naive consumers (right panel)
Red line: Uniform pricing; Blue dots: BBPD
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4.1.2 Effects on profits
We first look at how BBPD affects first period profit in our two-period model. The results
are plotted in Figure 3 left panel. We can see that first period profits with BBPD are above the





Figure 3: Left panel: first period profits (δ = 1); Right panel: Second period profit
Red line: Uniform pricing; Blue dots: BBPD
While BBPD generally raises first-period profits, the opposite happens for second period profit
(see Figure 3 right panel). It is important to stress that the decrease in second period profits due to
price discrimination is smaller when β increases. This suggests that the negative effect of BBPD on
second period profits falls when we depart from a uniform distribution of consumer preferences to a
triangular one. The reverse happens when the distribution of preferences becomes a reverse triangle.
Next, we report the discounted overall profit over the two periods. From Figure 4, we can see
that BBPD raises overall profits if β is sufficiently large. The exact threshold is presented in the
next proposition. While this is for δ = 1, based on Lemma 3 result (iii), the same threshold applies
for all δ > 0.
Proposition 5 For any δ > 0, BBPD boosts overall profits in comparison to uniform pricing as
long as β > 0.194. Otherwise the reverse happens.
4.2 Alternative distributions
Previously we have investigated a class of non-uniform distributions, captured by a single param-
eter β. This approach allows the density at the middle to differ from the density at the sides, and
we are able to confirm the intuition laid out in Section 3 where we compare uniform distribution
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Figure 4: Overall profits (δ = 1)
Red line: Uniform pricing; Blue dots: BBPD
and triangular distribution. That is, when consumer density is higher in the middle but lower on
the sides, the density difference (captured by β) hurts uniform price but helps with discriminatory
prices, everything else the same. When the density difference is sufficiently large, BBPD raises firms’
overall profits relative to uniform pricing.
The downside of considering a class of non-uniform distribution is that the equilibrium prices and
profits become extremely tedious. Next, we go back to uniform distribution, but allow piece-wise
distribution so densities differ between the middle and the sides. Suppose that some consumers
are uniformly distributed in the middle interval [a, 1 − a] with density fmiddle, and the remaining
consumers are uniformly distributed on the sides: [0, a)∪ (1−a, 1] with density fside. Let r ≡ fmiddlefside
define the density ratio. If the insights from our main model carry through here, we would expect
that BBPD raises overall profits when r is large, which we verify next.
Consumer mass is 1 so
fmiddle · (1− 2a) + fside · 2a = 1.
Combined with r = fmiddlefside , we can obtain,
fmiddle =
r
r − 2ra+ 2a
, fside =
1
r − 2ra+ 2a
.
We look for symmetric equilibrium under uniform pricing and under BBPD.
Start with uniform pricing. The marginal consumer x = 12 must be in the middle. The equilibrium
candidate is characterized by
pU =
r − 2ra+ 2a
r





Second-order conditions ensure that neither firm has an incentive to deviate when marginal
consumer is still in the middle. However, a firm can change its price significantly and push marginal
consumer to either side. Such an incentive is easier to curb if a is smaller. Later on under BBPD,
we want marginal consumers to be on the sides and need to curb firms’ incentive to deviate and
push marginal consumers to the middle. Such an incentive is easier to curb if a is larger. Taking
into account the opposite constraints on a under uniform pricing and BBPD respectively, we pick
an intermediate value of a = 25 . We then derive the equilibrium candidate under BBPD and find
that πBBPD − πU is proportional to δ, similar to the case of non-uniform distribution with general
β earlier. Thus we further normalize δ = 1. With a = 25 and δ = 1, the equilibrium candidate under




























(23r2 + 144r + 258)
90(r + 4)
.
It can be easily verified that πBBPD > πU if and only if r > r∗ ≈ 1.0561. We pick r = 1.06 and
verify that neither firm has an incentive to deviate, with or without changing the demand structure.
Note that if r = 1, then we are back to traditional uniform distribution, and BBPD reduces overall
profit.
5 Policy implications
In this section we discuss the main implications of our analysis for regulators and/or consumer
advocates. Policy recommendations should be based on whether BBPD benefits consumers or not.
A general presumption in the literature with uniformly distributed preferences fixed across time is
that “price discrimination by purchase history . . . is by and large unlikely to raise significant antitrust
concerns. In fact, as the economics literature suggests, such pricing practices in oligopoly markets
often intensify competition and potentially benefit consumers.” (Chen, 2005, p. 123). Our goal in
this section is to go beyond uniform distribution of consumer preferences and see how BBPD affects
consumer surplus and welfare. Our results show that the distribution of consumer preferences within
the product space plays an important role in determining these welfare implications.
In the absence of price discrimination, consumers always buy from the closer firm in both periods
which is efficient. With BBPD the first period equilibrium outcome is also efficient. However, the
second period switching lowers welfare. Next, we look at the question of how much switching should
we expect to occur. In the symmetric equilibrium, the share of consumers who switch firms in the
second period is
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Figure 5: Share of switchers
Figure 5 plots the share of switchers under BBPD as a function of β. With triangular distribution,
more consumers are in the middle, and consumers in the middle are also more likely to switch.
Therefore, BBPD leads to more switching in markets where the density of preferences at the center
is higher than when the density is the same everywhere (β = 0). The reverse happens when there
are more consumers located at the edges (β < 0).
Under BBPD, social surplus in period 2 is given by
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Social surplus in period 1 is given by








Overall social surplus under BBPD is
SSBBPD = ss1 + δ · ss2
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Social surplus under uniform pricing is









Figure 6 left panel plots the social surplus under uniform pricing and BBPD respectively, assuming
v = 2 and δ = 1. Because of inefficient switching, total transport cost is always higher and overall
social surplus is always lower under BBPD, relative to uniform pricing.
Figure 6: Social surplus (left) and consumer surplus (right)
Red line: Uniform pricing; Blue dots: BBPD
Look next at consumer surplus. The expressions are too lengthy to report, so we plot them in
Figure 6 right panel for BBPD and uniform pricing respectively, assuming that δ = 1 and v = 2. We
can see that the BBPD raises consumer surplus only when β is below a threshold (about 0.077).
Combining the results for consumers surplus and social surplus, we have the next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Consumer and social surplus) For any δ ∈ (0, 1], relative to uniform pricing, BBPD
hurts consumers if β > 0.077. In contrast, if β < 0.077 consumers are better off with BBPD. BBPD
always reduces social surplus.
An important contribution of our analysis is to highlight that welfare effects of BBPD in a
uniform distribution setting – higher consumer surplus at the expense of industry profits – do not
prevail when preferences are better represented by triangular distribution. We show that when β
is sufficiently high, BBPD can increase industry profits at the expense of consumer surplus and
inefficient switching becomes more prominent.
To summarize the main literature findings and inform competition policy agencies, Table 1 shows
the comparative static results obtained in a model of fixed uniform preferences across time (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 2000), in a model of uniform correlated preferences across time (Chen and Pearcy, 2010)
and in a model fixed non-uniform preferences across time (our analysis).
For overall welfare, because there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output,
variations in welfare are uniquely explained by the “disutility” incurred by consumers who buy
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Models Overall Profits CS W
Uniform distribution with fixed preferences
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
Below U Above U Below U
Uniform distribution with correlated preferences













U: uniform pricing; H(L)α:: high (low) α; H(L)β: high (low) β
Table 4: Comparative static results
inefficiently.13 There is no such inefficient purchase under uniform pricing, thus BBPD always hurts
overall welfare. Table 1 also shows that the profit and consumer welfare effects under fixed uniform
preferences are the reverse of their counterparts under non-uniform preferences with high β. Chen
and Pearcy (2010) shows that when consumer preferences’ dependence across time (α) is high, BBPD
benefits consumer and hurts profits (confirming the results in Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). However,
when consumer preferences’ dependence is low (or independent), BBPD boosts industry profits at
the expense of consumers. Their intuition is as follows. Unstable preferences across time introduces
uncertainty, which acts to soften price competition under BBPD. This in turn enhances industry
profits at the expense of consumers.
Summing up, the profit and welfare effects of BBPD depend on the way consumer preferences are
modeled and on what is learned about consumers. Our results, thus, carry important policy impli-
cations. If competition authorities focus on consumer welfare when appraising price discrimination,
our model suggests that they should scrutinize these pricing strategies with greater zeal in markets
where consumer preferences seem to be clustered at the center of the market.14
6 Conclusion
Existing research shows that access to consumer purchase history for price discrimination goals
can intensify competition and hurt firm profitability at the benefit of consumers. This is generally
the case when firms are symmetrically informed and consumer preferences are uniformly distributed
and fixed across time. Although the uniformity assumption is convenient for deriving analytical
results, it may not be satisfactory in representing actual consumer preferences in many markets,
frequently better represented by a non-uniform density. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to
13For a model where BBPD can affect aggregate output see Esteves and Reggiani (2014).
14Policy intervention may depend on the legal standard or general mission of the competition law in a specific
jurisdiction. According to the OECD (2018) report on price discrimination in digital markets, in 89% of the jurisdictions
consumer welfare is the primary goal or one of the goals of competition law. See also Lyons (2002).
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assess whether price discrimination based on purchasing history benefit/harm industry profits and
consumers in markets where the density of consumer preferences is non-uniform. With this goal in
mind, we depart from the base model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) by assuming that consumer
preferences follow a non-uniform distribution.
By so doing, this paper provides useful implications for managers and marketing practitioners
willing to use data on consumers’ purchase history for price discrimination. It is also useful for
competition agencies and consumer advocates. It highlights that the shape of preferences plays an
important role to the understanding of the profit and welfare effects of BBPD. Specifically, we show
that managers can use BBPD as a profitable strategy in markets where consumer preferences are
clustered at the center of the market. In other words, if consumer preferences follow a pure triangular
distribution, in contrast to the Fudenberg and Tirole conclusions, BBPD boosts industry profits at
the expense of consumer welfare. On the other hand, if consumer preferences follow reverse triangular
distribution, then the standard results under uniform distribution still prevail.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Due to symmetry, assume that xU1 ≤ 12 . We calculate each firm’s demand and profit, and then




























































(2βpA − 3βpB − βt− t) .
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., pA = pB. Solving the FOCs we can obtain









Note that when β 6= 0, density function f(x) changes functional form at x = 12 . Thus demand
has a kink at x = 12 . Nevertheless, we show that first-order condition continues to work for the
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when pA = pB. Let fL(x) and fR(x) denote the density
functions when x ≤ 12 (left) and x ≥
1
2 (right) respectively. At symmetry (pA = pB), if firm A





























always holds, and fL(x
U−
1 ) = fR(x
U+
1 ) because the density function f(x) is sym-





holds, and ∂πA∂pA is thus defined.
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The signs of SOCs are undetermined without substituting equilibrium prices. Evaluated at the
equilibrium prices, we have
∂2πA
∂(pA)2
= −1 + β + β
2
t(1 + β)
< 0, ∀β ∈ [−1, 1].
Thus it is a local maximum for firm A. Similarly, for firm B,
∂2πB
∂(pB)2




It is negative only if β >
√
5−3
2 ≡ β, which we designate as the lower bound of β.
16 Next, we show
that when β ≥ β, neither firm has an incentive to deviate so our equilibrium candidate is indeed
an equilibrium. This is needed because the SOCs above are evaluated at the equilibrium candidate
only.
We want to show that neither firm has an incentive to raise or lower price. Due to symmetry, we
only rule out firm A’s incentive to raise pA and firm B’s incentive to lower pB. Under both deviations,
x1 ≤ 12 holds so the assumed demand structure of the preceding analysis is satisfied. First fix pB at
the equilibrium level (pB = p
U ), and allow firm A to raise its price to pdevA . Denote firm A’s deviation
profit by πA(p
dev
A , pB = p
U ). We find that πA(p
dev
A , pB = p
U ) is lower than the equilibrium level for
any pdevA > p
U . Thus firm A has no incentive to deviate and raise pA. Next, fix pA = p
U and allow
firm B to lower its price to pdevB . We find that its deviation profit πB(pA = p
U , pdevB ) is lower than
the equilibrium level for any pdevB < p
U . Thus firm B has no incentive to deviate and lower pB.
Proof of Lemma 2




















, which are valid only when xU1 <
1
2
. When evaluated at xU1 =
1
2



















16There may exist asymmetric equilibria when β < β. But exploring the asymmetric equilibria is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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Let x1 denote the marginal consumer in period 1. That is, consumers to the left of x1 (firm A’s
turf) buy from firm A in period 1, while consumers to the right of x1 (firm B’s turf) buy from firm
B. Without loss of generality, assume that x1 ≤ 12 .
In the second period, each firm charges different prices on these two turfs. Let xA and xB denote














Since the density function f(x) takes different functional form depending on whether x is above or
below 12 , we need to determine whether xA and xB are above or below
1
2 . First note that xA < x1 ≤
1
2 .
Next, if we assume xB ≤ 12 , then the “equilibrium” second period prices lead to xB >
1




Let pji denote the price which firm i = A,B charges to its j = o, n (old, new) group of consumers.



































In firm A’s turf, however, equilibrium prices have different functional forms depending on whether
x1 is above a threshold level. In particular,
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The case of x1 <
1
3 is needed when we check firms’ incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.







since we look for the symmetric equilibrium (x1 =
1
2), and the
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Proof of Proposition 2
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Consider firm A’s FOC when maximizing overall profit with respect to first-period price,


































































pBBPD1 f(x1) + δΛ
]
= 0,
where pBBPD1 denotes the optimal p
1
A under BBPD.
Note that under BBPD, a change in p1A affects x1 which in turn changes second period prices.
Forward-looking consumers take this into account. This strategic thinking helps determine how x1
responds to a change in p1A, and is reflected in the term
∂x1
∂p1A
. We can define a new term ∂̂x1
∂p1A
which
ignores this strategic thinking. ∂̂x1
∂p1A
can be calculated for uniform pricing and BBPD respectively,
and they must be the same.
Under uniform pricing, with symmetry, we have
1
2




where pU1 denotes the optimal p
1
A under uniform pricing.




















pBBPD1 · f(x1) + δΛ
]
= 0


















From the above equation, the impact of BBPD on first period prices can be decomposed into a
consumer-side effect and a separate firm-side effect.
Proof of Proposition 3
Earlier we have solved the game in period 2. Next, we move on to period 1. Consider the marginal
consumer, located at x1. If she purchases from firm A, she will be poached by firm B in period 2,
and enjoy an overall utility of
uA(x1) = u1A + δ · u2B = (v − p1A − tx1) + δ(v − pnB − t(1− x1)).
In contrast, if she purchases from firm B in period 1, she will be poached by firm A in period 2
and enjoy an overall utility of
uB(x1) = u1B + δ · u2A = (v − p1B − t(1− x1)) + δ(v − pnA − tx1).
Since consumer x1 is indifferent between buying from either firm, it must be that










Closed form solution for x1 cannot be obtained. Instead, we use implicit function theorem to solve
the FOCs. A change in p1A affects discounted overall profit πA through 3 channels: (i) directly through
p1A on π
1
A; (ii) indirectly through x1 on π
1
A; (iii) indirectly through x1 on π
2
A (needs discounting).

















We calculate the three terms in the FOC, and add them up to get firm A’s FOC. Solve firm A’s
FOC and imposing symmetry (p1A = p
1




















































each firm’s overall profit is
πBBPD = p1A ·
1
2


















































The first integration is consumers’ utility of buying from firm A in the first period, the second
and third integration are these consumers’ utility in period 2 when they buy from firm A and B
respectively. Multiplying by 2 gives the surplus for all consumers.
Under triangular distribution, demand kinks at x = 12 . However,
∂πA
∂p1A












, just as in the case of uniform pricing which we discussed
in proof of Proposition 1. We also show that neither firm has an incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium period 1 prices. To do so, we check how a firm’s deviation profit varies with x1 rather
than its period 1 deviation price. With x1 ≤ 12 , firm A can raise its price without violating the
assumed demand structure. We find that firm A’s deviation profit increases with x1 when x1 ≤ 12 .
Thus firm A (and by symmetry firm B) has no incentive to raise price. Similarly, with x1 ≤ 12 ,
firm B can lower its price without violating the assumed demand structure. We find that firm B’s
deviation profit increases with x1. Thus firm B (and by symmetry firm A) has no incentive to lower
price.
BBPD with general β
We solve the game backwards, starting with the second period.
Second period:
Recall that firms’ period 1 prices are p1A and p
1
B, and the marginal consumer is located at x1 ≤
1
2 .
Period 1 demand is given by
q1A = F (x1), q
1
B = 1− F (x1).
In period 2, firm A (B) charges a price of poA (p
o
B) to the consumers locating on firm A’s (B’s)
turf; and a price of pnA (p
n
B) to the consumers on its competitor’s turf. Let xA (xB) denote the
















Substituting xA and xB, we have
qoA = F (xA) =
1
2
(1 + pnB − poA)(1 + pnB − poA),
qnB = F (x1)− F (xA) =
1
2
(poA − pnB + 2x1 − 1)(1 + 2x1 + pnB − poA),
qnA = F (xB)− F (x1) =
1
2
[(poB − pnA)(2 + pnA − poB) + (1− 2x1)(1 + 2x1)] ,
qoB = 1− F (xB) =
1
2
(pnA − poB + 1)(pnA − poB + 1).
Firm i = A,B’s problem is to choose (poi , p
n
























= F (x1)− F (xA)− pnB ·





= F (xB)− F (x1)− pnA ·












= 0 (where i = A,B, j = o, n) for pji . There are two roots to each FOC, one of
which leads to a violation. We pick the other root.17




A ≥ 0 always holds in firm




6β is needed to have p
n
B ≥ 0. Otherwise
firm A’s turf is too small that it will drive firm B out of the market completely (with pnB = 0 and
poA = 1− 2x1). Combining both cases of x1, we have the following:





40β3x21 − 20β3x1 + 40β2x21 − 3β3 − 17β2 + 20βx1 + E − 17β − 3
)
, if β ∈ (0, 1],
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48βB [H(8β
2x21 − 4β2x1 − β2 + 4βx1 − 2β − 1)− 112β3x21 + 56β3x1 − 112β2x21 + 10β3




3x1 − 48β3x21 − 48β2x21 + 10β3 + 14β2 − 24βx1 + 14β + 10




8β3x21 − 4β3x1 + 8β2x21 − 3β3 − β2 + 4βx1 − β − 3 +D
)
, if β ∈ [β, 0).




= 0 for poA, one of the root leads to xA < 0. We do not report the intermediate
results here as they are too lengthy. Maple programs are available upon request.
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(ii) In firm A’s turf, however, equilibrium prices have different functional forms depending on
whether x1 is above a threshold. In particular,









poA = 1− 2x1, pnB = 0,













2x21 − 4β2x1 + β2 + 4βx1 − 2β + 1) + 24β3x1 − 48β3x21 − 48β2x21 − 10β3




8β3x21 − 4β3x1 + 8β2x21 + 3β3 − 3β2 + 4βx1 − 3β + 3− F
)





3x1 − 40β3x21 − 40β2x21 − 3β3 + 3β2 − 20βx1 + 3β − 3 + C), if β ∈ (0, 1],
1
48βA(J(8β
2x21 − 4β2x1 + β2 + 4βx1 − 2β + 1)− 112β3x21 + 56β3x1 − 112β2x21 − 10β3
+10β2 − 56βx1 + 10β − 10− 2F ), if β ∈ [β, 0),
where
A = 8β2x21 − 4β2x1 + β2 + 4βx1 − 2β + 1,
B = 8β2x21 − 4β2x1 − β2 + 4βx1 − 2β − 1,
C =
√
(64β2x21 − 32β2x1 + 9β2 + 32βx1 − 14β + 9)(24β2x21 − 12β2x1 + β2 + 12βx1 − 2β + 1)2,
D =
√
−(64β2x21 − 32β2x1 − 9β2 + 32βx1 − 18β − 9)(8β2x21 − 4β2x1 + β2 + 4βx1 − 6β + 1)2,
E =
√
−(64β2x21 − 32β2x1 − 9β2 + 32βx1 − 18β − 9)(24β2x21 − 12β2x1 − β2 + 12βx1 − 10β − 1)2,
F =
√




(113− 626β + 952βx1 + 113β6 + 18432β6x61 − 27648β6x51 + 24384β6x41 + 27648β5x51
− 12864β6x31 + 4544β6x21 − 952β6x1 − 626β5 + 1487β4 − 1948β3 + 24384β4x41 − 46464β5x41
+ 36288β5x31 − 17024β5x21 − 36288β4x31 + 4472β5x1 + 24960β4x21 − 8656β4x1 + 12864β3x31
− 17024β3x21 + 8656β3x1 − 4472β2x1 + 4454β2x21 + 1487β2
+ (5β3 − 5β2 − 5β + 5− 12β3x1 + 24β2x21 + 12βx1 + 24β3x21)C))1/2,
33
H = (− 2
B2
(−113− 1030β + 1656βx1 − 113β6 + 100352β6x61 − 150528β6x51 + 43200β6x41
+ 150528β5x51 + 19520β
6x31 − 4704β6x21 − 1656β6x1 − 1030β5 − 3423β4 − 5012β3 + 43200β4x41
− 243328β5x41 + 98368β5x31 + 12736β5x21 − 98368β4x31 − 8296β5x1 + 65600β4x21 − 7664β4x1
− 19520β3x31 + 12736β3x21 + 7664β3x1 + 8296β2x1 − 4704β2x21 − 3423β2)
+ (56β2x21 − 5β3 − 23β2 − 23β − 5 + 56β3x21 − 28β3x1 + 28βx1)D)1/2,
I = (− 2
B2
(−113− 326β + 952βx1 + 6592β3x21 + 880β3x1 + 808β2x1 − 736β2x21 − 607β2 − 113β6
+ 18432β6x61 − 27648β6x51 + 3264β6x41 + 27648β5x51 + 8256β6x31 − 736β6x21 − 952β6x1 + 3264β4x41
− 36480β5x41 + 5184β5x31 + 6592β5x21 − 5184β4x31 − 808β5x1 + 4416β4x21 − 880β4x1 − 326β5




(113− 626β + 1656βx1 + 11328β2x21 − 7736β2x1 − 150528β6x51 + 100352β6x61 + 150528β5x51
+ 113β6 − 44608β6x31 + 11328β6x21 − 1656β6x1 + 7736β5x1 + 107328β6x41 − 626β5
+ 1487β4 − 1948β3 − 208256β5x41 + 127424β5x31 − 42624β5x21 − 127424β4x31 + 62592β4x21
+ 107328β4x41 − 14928β4x1 + 44608β3x31 + 14928β3x1 − 42624β3x21 + 1487β2
+ (5β3 − 5β2 − 5β + 5 + 56β2x21 + 28βx1 + 56β3x21 − 28β3x1)F )1/2.
We also verify that the above prices constitute an equilibrium, by showing that in each firm’s
turf, no firm has an incentive to deviate unilaterally.
First period:
Due to the complexity of the distribution function, closed form solution for period 1 marginal
consumer x1 cannot be obtained. Instead, we rely on implicity function theorem to solve the FOCs.
Firm i = A,B’s first period profit is,
π1i = p
1
i · q1i ,











i ), i = A,B.





through x1 on π
1
A; (iii) indirectly through x1 on π
2


















We calculate the three terms in firm A’s FOC, and then add them up. Solving the FOC and
imposing symmetry (p1A = p
1
B), we can obtain,
p1A =
−1
288KLβ(β + 1)(β2 + 1)4
× ((8278β16δ + 42232β15δ − 92472β14δ + 265160β13δ − 432648β12δ
+ 614744β11δ − 833480β10δ + 842728β9δ − 994972β8δ + 842728β7δ − 833480β6δ + 614744β5δ
− 432648β4δ + 265160β3δ − 92472β2δ + 42232βδ − 32544β15 + 43200β14 − 241632β13 + 249984β12
− 752544β11 + 611136β10 − 1277280β9 + 808704β8 − 1277280β7 + 611136β6 − 752544β5 + 249984β4
− 241632β3 + 43200β2 − 32544β + 8278δ)K − 41218β19δ − 354402β18δ − 681914β17δ − 900090β16δ
− 3922656β15δ − 1195392β14δ − 9649104β13δ − 3195888β12δ − 12327988β11δ − 8539796β10δ
− 8539796β9δ − 12327988β8δ − 3195888β7δ − 9649104β6δ − 1195392β5δ − 3922656β4δ − 900090β3δ
− 681914β2δ − 354402βδ − 12960β18 − 109152β17 − 345024β16 − 783936β15 − 1732032β14
− 2525760β13 − 4084416β12 − 4739904β11 − 5573376β10 − 5573376β9 − 4739904β8 − 4084416β7
− 2525760β6 − 1732032β5 − 783936β4 − 345024β3 − 109152β2 − 12960β − 41218δ
+ ((201β15 + 807β14 + 157β13 + 4019β12 + 1329β11 + 7999β10 + 4861β9 + 8275β8 + 8275β7
+ 4861β6 + 7999β5 + 1329β4 + 4019β3 + 157β2 + 807β + 201)K + 421β18 + 988β17 + 3113β16
+ 21520β15 + 19896β14 + 64816β13 + 75696β12 + 102896β11 + 149706β10 + 117224β9 + 149706β8





if β ∈ (0, 1],18
where
K = (β2 + 4β + 1)
√
9β2 + 2β + 9,
L = 113β6 − 150β5 + 387β4 − 268β3 + 387β2 − 150β + 113 + (5β3 + β2 + β + 5)K,





288βMN(β + 1)(β2 + 1)4
× ((32544β15 + 58176β14 + 260064β13 + 358272β12 + 844704β11
+ 909504β10 + 1461600β9 + 1218816β8 + 1461600β7 + 909504β6 + 844704β5 + 358272β4 + 260064β3
+ 58176β2 + 32544β − 11802β16δ − 79656β15δ − 206136β14δ − 569112β13δ − 935240β12δ
− 1749832β11δ − 2166728β10δ − 3014766β9δ − 2859836β8δ − 3014776β7δ − 2166728β6δ − 1749832β5δ
− 935240β4δ − 569112β3δ − 206136β2δ − 79656βδ − 11802δ)M + 6734β19δ + 56222β18δ − 99450β17δ
− 210090β16δ − 1098144β15δ − 1886784β14δ − 3962640β13δ − 5796528β12δ − 8210772β11δ
− 9448916β10δ − 9448916β9δ − 8210772β8δ − 5796528β7δ − 3962640β6δ − 1886784β5δ − 1098144β4δ
− 210090β3δ − 99450β2δ + 56222βδ + 6734δ + 12960β18 − 77472β17 + 116928β16 − 232128β15
+ 582336β14 + 90432β13 + 1497024β12 + 1198656β11 + 1972224β10 + 1972224β9
+ 1198656β8 + 1497024β7 + 90432β6 + 582336β5 − 232128β4 + 116928β3 − 77472β2 + 12960β
+ (133β18 − 2700β17 + 585β16 + 10608β15 + 34296β14 + 77200β13 + 110960β12 + 142480β11
+ 160202β10 + 157176β9 + 160202β8 + 142480β7 + 110960β6 + 77200β5 + 34296β4 + 10608β3
+ 585β2 − 2700β + 133 + (553β15 + 4359β14 + 10557β13 + 28499β12 + 44561β11
+ 73247β10 + 88477β9 + 103027β8 + 103027β7 + 88477β6 + 73247β5 + 44561β4 + 28499β3 + 10557β2





if β ∈ (β, 0),where
M = (β2 − 4β + 1)
√
9β2 + 2β + 9,
N = 113β6 + 202β5 + 451β4 + 436β3 + 451β2 + 202β + 113 + (5β3 + 9β2 + 9β + 5)M.
With symmetry, p1B = p
1
A and x1 =
1
2 , which allows us to calculate first period profit. Substituting
x1 =
1
2 into the second period price expressions, we can obtain the second period equilibrium prices
and in turn profits.
Similar to the case of β = 1, we verify that no firm has an incentive to deviate unilaterally.
Instead of checking how a deviating firm’s profit varies with its price, we check how its deviation
profit varies with x1.
19 We first look at firm A, which can raise its price without violating the
assumed demand structure x1 ≤ 12 . We find that firm A’s profit increases with x1 when x1 ≤
1
2 .
Thus firm A (and by symmetry firm B) has no incentive to raise price. Next, consider firm B, which
can lower its price without violating the assumed demand structure x1 ≤ 12 . We find that firm B’s
profit increases with x1 when x1 ≤ 12 . Thus firm B (and by symmetry firm A) has no incentive to
lower its price.
19The reason is that because we cannot get a closed form solution for x1, the deviating firm’s profit cannot be written
explicitly as a function of its first period price.
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Proof of Lemma 3
(i) is obvious. Given that x1 =
1
2 , δ does not enter into second period pricing decisions.
(ii) While the pBBPD1 expressions are lengthy, using software we can easily verify that p
BBPD
1 −pU1
is proportional to δ and the coefficient is a function of β only, which we denote as g(β).
(iii) We start with social surplus. Under inelastic demand, social surplus is determined by total
transport cost. In particular, in period 2 under BBPD, consumers in [xA, 1/2] (and by symmetry
those in (1/2, xB]) purchase from the firm which is further away, leading to efficiency loss relative to
uniform pricing. Therefore,





[t(1− x)− tx] · f(x)dx
]
,
= δ · h(x),
where f(x) = 4βx + (1 − β) is the density function, and the marginal consumer xA is linear in
second period prices which depend on β but not on δ, after we normalize t = 1. There is a δ in
SSBBPD − SSU because the transport cost difference occurs in the second period only.



























The term in the square bracket is a function of β only, because of each of its 3 components is
a function of β only. Then BBPD raises (lowers) overall profits if and only if this term is positive
(negative), independent of δ.
Next, we consider consumer surplus. Note that

















Since both SSBBPD − SSU and πBBPD − πU are proportional to δ, CSBBPD − CSU must be
proportional to δ as well.
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